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  3  41.  Introduction 
 
In the last two decades many countries have embarked on major privatization programs, but 
there are still several countries that have been reluctant to privatize. This is particularly true in 
developing countries, as reflected by the fact that state-owned enterprises in these countries 
continue to account for more than 10 percent of gross domestic product, 20 percent of 
investment, and about 5 percent of formal employment (Kikeri, 1999). While there is growing 
evidence on the benefits of privatization (see, for example, Megginson and Netter, 2001, and La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999), the unwillingness to privatize appears to be associated with a 
rather negative perception of the privatization process with respect to the labor force. Critics 
argue that poor labor force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish 
better retrenchment programs.  
On the other hand, opponents of the government’s restructuring of to-be-privatized firms 
argue that public unions can influence the future of politicians, effectively reducing the 
government’s bargaining power (Freeman, 1986, and López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). It has also been argued that it is not worth spending resources in restructuring the labor 
force before privatization, as governments may not be able to identify the particular workers who 
should be retained (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999, and Rama, 1999). Governments that 
administer the human resources of these firms risk retrenching the wrong, more productive 
personnel. This could result in the loss of know-how that, at a minimum, could exacerbate short-
run post-privatization efficiency problems and, at worst, may be linked with permanent damage 
to the productive structure of the firm. Dismissing the workers that the new owners would rather 
keep may not only fail to add value to the firm, but it could also reduce privatization prices. This 
is particularly true in developing countries where available information is even more lacking 
(Rama, 1999).  
Although labor restructuring is one of the most difficult and sensitive issues in 
privatization, the available empirical literature is quite scarce as a result of the lack of data. Our 
paper contributes to this literature in three ways: by creating a new cross-country database with 
detailed information about labor retrenchment policies before privatization and labor re-hiring 
efforts after the firms go into private hands; by documenting the effects of different labor 
restructuring policies on the net privatization prices paid by buyers; and by analyzing worker re-
hiring in privatized firms that were subjected to various types of retrenchment programs.  
  5The paper pays particular attention to the quality of various labor retrenchment processes. 
In fact, not all targeting is created equal. From an empirical perspective, it may well be the case 
that a state-owned enterprise might be able to fetch a higher privatization price by applying a 
targeting mechanism that could prove very costly afterwards. An example is the case of age-
biased retrenchment, where retrenchment targets older and typically more expensive workers. 
Although privatization prices may be thought to increase as a result of this policy through 
expected lower operation costs of the firm, the net impact on future efficiency is unclear as some 
of these workers may also have been more productive, more experienced or better trained.  
Another example is the case of voluntary downsizing, whereby workers are offered 
severance packages to induce them leave the firm. This kind of program could provide the wrong 
incentives, as the best workers are likely to leave and the worst to stay. As in the case of age-
biased downsizing, short-term financial gains through potential higher privatization prices may 
prove costly because of the post-privatization losses due to economic inefficiencies (Rama, 
1999). 
Unlike the previous literature, which focused on the effects of restructuring on prices for 
the case of Mexico (López-de-Silanes, 1997), the nature of our data allows us to look at two 
complementary slices of the picture before and after privatization across countries. We are able 
to analyze the impact of a large set of labor policies before privatization and observe private 
firms’ reactions in terms of re-hiring previously fired workers. Our analysis uses these two types 
of results to provide an evaluation of the price effect of labor restructuring policies and the 
managerial quality of the downsizing efforts carried out by the government before privatization.  
The database was constructed by randomly selecting 400 firms privatized between 1982-
2000 around the world. We obtained pre- and post-privatization data by sending a detailed 
questionnaire to the CEOs of privatized firms and accessing privatization files. We followed up 
with each of the firms and corroborated their answers with several public sources and data for 
these firms coming from international financial agencies and privatization ministries. The result 
is a comprehensive cross-country database with firm characteristics, detailed labor restructuring 
policies before privatization, and labor re-hiring policies after the firm entered the private 
sphere.
2  
                                                       
2 An additional benefit of this data is that it allows us to consider the effect of failed privatizations on prices, rarely 
treated in the literature. Research on privatization implicitly sets aside failed privatizations since data is typically 
available only for companies that actually attract bidders. This potentially underestimates the impact of labor 
  6The basic thrust of our results is that adverse selection plagues retrenchment programs 
carried out by governments before privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, labor downsizing 
is not effective in boosting net privatization prices.
3 This finding may appear somewhat 
counterintuitive, as, according to the conventional wisdom, sellers will always want the 
government to downsize prior to privatization. However, this is fairly consistent with the 
political view on prior restructuring before privatization (López-de-Silanes, 1997) as described 
above. In fact, to further study the results in the area of downsizing, we focus on the nature of the 
retrenchment process prior to privatization and its impact on re-hiring. Confirming the adverse 
selection argument, several kinds of voluntary downsizing lead to a higher frequency of re-hiring 
of the same workers by the new private owners.  
The exception is the case of skill-based programs, as such programs are marginally 
associated with higher prices and lower re-hiring rates after privatization in particular, but not 
robustly, in the case of compulsory skill-biased programs.  One could argue that the nature of the 
program itself, typically based on written exams or panel reviews, may partly explain these 
results. Unfortunately, this policy is one of the most politically difficult to implement by the 
government and requires a tough stance. Results show that the managerial quality of the 
government may have an impact in the results, but as a general policy it appears that not much 
time and effort should be spent on labor restructuring before privatization. Results also show that 
endogeneity is controlled for, pay cuts do not raise prices while employment guarantee programs 
forced on the buyer do carry a significant discount in prices. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data collection process 
and discusses the empirical methodology. In Section 3, we test whether labor restructuring has an 
impact on privatization prices and whether such results hold when failed privatization and/or 
potential endogeneity are taken into account. Section 4 extends our results on prices for specific 
types of downsizing measures. Section 5 provides a new look at the effect of prior downsizing by 
the government by analyzing the nature of post-privatization re-hires by private owners. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
changes for these companies, which are likely the ones that went through more thorough restructuring efforts prior 
to privatization. Methodologically, this issue is addressed by using a simple non-linear procedure for the entire, 
truncated distribution of privatization prices. 
  72.  Data and Methodology 
 
Our sample was formed based on a list compiled by the authors of about 1,500 privatizations 
around the world covering the period 1982-2000.
4 The two main sources for this list are the 
World Bank Privatization database and Privatisation International, which together arguably 
provide the largest source of privatization transactions in the world. From this original list, we 
selected a random sample of 400 big and small firms to whom we sent a detailed questionnaire 
designed by the authors. The questionnaire was addressed to the CEO with a recommendation to 
direct it to the chief financial officer and the director of human resources of the firm.
5  
In order to ensure the quality of our data, we employed four additional sources. First, we 
took advantage of the fact that in several developing countries many privatizations have been 
performed as part of structural adjustment or other lending programs with the support of the 
World Bank. We were able to access a wide range of the World Bank’s internal documents to 
double check and, in some instances, complement the information collected in our survey. In 
particular, we made extensive use of the World Bank’s electronic Intranet system called 
ImageBank, which allows full access to such documents.
6 Second, we also made broad use of 
NEXIS to search a number of national and international publications.
7 Third, whenever possible 
we interviewed officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-
American Development Bank who were directly associated with the privatization programs in 
different countries.
8 Finally, when necessary, we directly contacted the privatization offices or 
corresponding ministries (e.g., finance, industry) of each country to request specific pre-
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 As defined by the amount that accrues to the government after all costs are taken into account, adjusted by shares 
sold and divided by average sales during the three years prior to privatization. 
4 We excluded voucher privatizations. As has been discussed elsewhere, there are fundamental differences between 
that privatization technique and others, which would have made comparisons particularly difficult (Boycko, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994).  
5 While directors of human resources answered 71.4 percent of the labor part of the questionnaires, public relations 
managers answered 16.6 percent of them. Personnel working at human resources departments other than managers 
answered about 5.5 percent, and personnel working at public relations answered 6.5 percent, usually on behalf of 
managers. Financial information was typically provided by the office of the chief financial officer or, in the case of 
small firms, by the office of the CEO. 
6 Typical World Bank documents include Country Economic Reports, Staff Appraisal Reports, President’s Reports, 
Supervision Documents, Project Completion Reports, Audit Reports, Operation Evaluation Studies and Sector 
Reports. We covered about 63.4 percent of the sample. 
7 To do this, we mainly employed the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times,  Oxford Analytica, and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit. We covered around 70.1 percent of the sample. 
8 We also specifically selected firms totaling about 15 percent of the total sample and double or triple checked most 
of the information.  
  8privatization information that was missing.
9 Whenever we found discrepancies we again 
contacted the national privatization agencies and the firms themselves to clarify the issues.
10  
We organized the questionnaire into four sections. The first area covers pre-privatization 
firm characteristics and asks about sales, assets, profits, liabilities, management changes, and 
sector of origin. The second area covers pre-privatization labor characteristics and policies, and 
asks about number of blue and white collar workers, presence and incidence of unions, number 
of strikes, political affiliation of unions, labor restructuring measures and targets. The third area 
focuses on the privatization process, and in particular, on privatization prices, transaction 
methods used, shares sold, and foreign participation. Finally, the fourth area includes post-
privatization labor re-hiring policies. We tried to get both dummy variables and exact numbers of 
workers for every possible category. However, we were not able to achieve this, as most 
respondents did not provide enough numerical information about the workers involved in various 
retrenchment and re-hiring programs, so we settled for dummy variables that tell us if the 
policies were undertaken or not.
11 Table 1 provides definitions of the specific variables that we 
collected.  
Table 2 shows the results of our efforts to gather data. Out of the 400 cases targeted, we 
ultimately collected data for 308 privatizations in 84 countries for the period 1982-2000. Of 
those, 16 are failed privatizations or operations in which preparation for privatization occurred 
but in which the sale did not materialize. As the table indicates, the complete information for our 
308 firms accounts for 97.21 percent of total sales. Twenty-five companies comprising about one 
percent of total sales supplied quite deficient information that could not be further completed and 
thus, was ultimately not used. Additionally, 26 firms did not respond to our requests, denied the 
existence of information, or simply refused to provide it. Twenty-two firms, accounting for 0.78 
percent of total sales, could not be included since they have been liquidated and no longer exist. 
Finally, 19 firms could not be included in our sample as they have merged and no longer keep 
separate accounting and financial statements. The pattern in our resulting sample in terms of 
region, year of privatization, and sector fits closely with the compiled list of privatizations of 
                                                       
9 Using this approach, we covered 73.2 percent of the sample. 
10 We found most discrepancies in developing countries, particularly Africa and the Middle East. Whenever data led 
to significant discrepancies that could not be reconciled, the firms were eliminated from the sample. This occurred in 
6 cases in total: 4 from Africa, 1 from the Middle East, and 1 from Asia. These firms were classified under the 
category of firms that supplied incomplete information in Table 2. 
11 In fact, only 26.3 percent of respondents provided some numerical information. 
  9Privatisation International and the World Bank, particularly when excluding voucher 
privatizations. We can therefore reasonably conclude that our sample is unbiased.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of our sample by region of the world with respect to the 
pattern found in the original privatization lists. Whereas 33 percent of the privatizations in our 
sample are from Latin America, 8 percent from Asia, 21 percent from Africa and the Middle 
East, 25 percent from developed countries, and 13 percent from Transition Economies, the 
corresponding percentages for the original list are 29, 10, 20, 23, and 18 percent, respectively. 
Similarly, Figure 2 compares the distribution of privatizations in our sample and the original list 
of privatizations. In both cases, the bulk of privatizations—more than half of operations in our 
sample—were carried out between the mid-1990s and late 1990s. Finally, Figure 3 compares the 
distribution of privatizations by broad sector category and, as before, the resulting pattern is 
remarkably similar in both cases.
12  
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The set of 
variables is organized according to firm attributes, privatization characteristics, labor 
characteristics, labor restructuring policies, and some basic post-privatization hiring measures. 
Along the lines of López-de-Silanes (1997), the net privatization price is defined as the amount 
that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into 
account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to 
the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided 
by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The real value of the 
resulting number as of December 2000 is the dependent variable employed, which is labeled 
“Net Privatization Price / Sales.”
13 
The labor downsizing variable may be viewed as a basic summary measure of labor 
restructuring, as it is typically the most widely employed and most relevant from a policy 
perspective. This variable is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm undertook 
any reduction in the labor force up to three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise. We 
                                                       
12 The World Bank privatization data, which are for developing and transition economies, also only contain 
information on number of shares sold and foreign participation. When we compare our developing country sub-
sample (231 observations) to the one from the World Bank we also find a very consistent pattern between both 
databases. 
13 López-de-Silanes (1997) also uses firms’ total assets and total liabilities to develop a so-called Privatization Q. In 
our case, such a variable was not possible to construct. However, as a rough proxy in our regressions we include a 
dummy variable that equals one when total liabilities are greater than total assets (see Table 1 for variable 
definition).  
  10follow Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) and classify this variable by type, as voluntary and 
compulsory, and by targeting nature, as age-biased, skill-biased, and female-biased downsizing. 
Table 4 provides a breakdown of our sample along these lines. Voluntary downsizing is defined 
as any kind of non-compulsory labor downsizing in which the worker chooses to leave, typically 
as a result of a monetary or non-monetary severance compensation package by the firm. 
Monetary packages are usually given as a function of two variables: wage and seniority. 
Typically, the older the worker and the higher the current wage, the larger the severance 
package.
14 Pension enhancements and similar benefits can also be included under this category. 
Non-monetary packages include any type of in-kind payment that ranges from training to other 
similar enhancements to the safety net intended to help workers that leave, for example by 
providing food and clothing.
15  
The type of targeting employed, if any, is another useful classification of labor 
downsizing. As mentioned above, three are considered in this paper: age-biased, skill-biased, and 
gender-biased downsizing. Clearly, age-biased downsizing includes any labor cut that uses age 
as a reference. This type of downsizing may be applied in the context of voluntary or involuntary 
downsizing programs. In fact, while voluntary age-biased downsizing is found in nearly 34 
percent of total downsizing cases (and 82 percent of total voluntary cases), this kind of 
downsizing is not limited to choice, as it may be implemented by force as well. In fact, one-half 
of all the involuntary downsizing cases are age-biased. This is illustrated in Table 4. The most 
common age-biased downsizing programs are voluntary early retirement programs through 
pension enhancements, which target older workers.
16  Mandatory retirement of a specific group 
of older workers is relatively common in developing countries as well.  
Skill-biased downsizing includes any labor cut that uses any written or oral method, test, 
interview, or certification to measure skills or occupational ability as a retrenchment reference. 
Thus, skill-biased programs restrict the program along detailed occupational or skill groupings 
(Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999). A typical example is testing workers on general or particular 
labor skills in order to decide whether to keep them. The Peruvian Tax Administration in the 
                                                       
14 Recent research proposes using compensation schemes based on additional characteristics of the individual or his 
or her household (such as education, gender, and others) and not just wage and seniority (Rama, 1999, and Chong 
and Rama, 2001). 
15 This last is not uncommon in African countries. 
16 This program typically improves pension benefits if the worker retires earlier than the legal or agreed-upon age. It 
has been applied widely in developing and developed countries. 
  11early 1990s provides a classic example of this.  All workers were required to pass a written test 
to keep their jobs. Those workers that did not pass were fired, and the new potential workers 
brought in to replace the old ones also had to pass a written exam. As a consequence of this, 
turnover in the Tax Agency reached about 30 percent. Another example is the case of the Central 
Bank of Ecuador. After a disastrous attempt to downsize using voluntary programs, the Central 
Bank decided to classify all of its personnel into three categories: those who were essential for its 
functioning, those who were clearly redundant, and those about whom it was difficult to tell. 
This classification was based on the nature of the worker’s unit, occupation and educational 
attainment. Essential workers did not have the option of leaving (they were ring fenced), 
redundant workers did not have the option of staying, and the rest were offered a voluntary 
separation program (Rama and MacIsaac, 1999). 
Gender-biased retrenchment refers to labor cuts based on any implicit or explicit gender-
based indicators. Practically all gender-biased retrenchment is female-biased. Since most 
developed countries have laws against gender discrimination and in both developing and 
developed countries such bias is, at least explicitly, considered unethical, we expect this variable 
to bias downwards. Finally, neutral downsizing refers to those labor cuts that do not include any 
of the three target groups above. Though in theory a firm may apply more than one targeted 
downsizing mechanism at the same time, interestingly, the overlap of retrenchment policies is 
relatively small in the case of our sample of firms; 87 percent of firms did not apply more than a 
single mechanism. Less than 1 percent of firms in our sample applied skill, age, and female-
biased retrenchment at the same time when downsizing, as shown in Table 4.
17 
Roughly 78 percent of our sample of firms carried out some labor force downsizing, most 
of it compulsory, as illustrated in Table 5.
18 A similar percentage is found when looking at 
regions.
19 However, the data show great variation in the labor cuts before privatization both in 
terms of their nature as well as across regions. For instance, age-biased downsizing is the most 
predominant type in our sample, with 49 percent of firms using it. On the other hand, skill-biased 
                                                       
17 Also, while voluntary and compulsory downsizing may have been used simultaneously, as the above example of 
the Central Bank of Ecuador shows, this was an extremely uncommon occurrence according to our sample. Among 
the three instances where this occurred, we treated one as two separate episodes, and in the others we chose the 
predominant downsizing method. 
18 This percentage is strikingly similar to the one found by Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) for 41 retrenchment 
programs in 37 countries using a mainly public sector sample. They also find that compulsory downsizing is as 
predominant as voluntary downsizing (46 percent in our sample). 
  12retrenchment is used by only 13 percent of state-owned enterprises worldwide, mostly by 
developed countries with 15 percent. Additionally, Table 5 also includes two other labor 
restructuring policies, employment guarantees (after privatization) and pay cuts (prior to 
privatization). These are dummy variables that capture whether a specific firm proceeded with 
that policy in any of the three years that preceded privatization. As their names indicate, their 
interpretation is straightforward.  
Table 6 provides some simple correlations of our labor downsizing measures. Two 
features stand out. First, the general downsizing measure is, as expected, correlated with its 
components, particularly voluntary downsizing. Second, the voluntary downsizing measure is 
significantly correlated with age-biased downsizing, since early retirement programs are 
frequently used as a downsizing mechanism. Otherwise, however, there is little significant 
correlation among downsizing measures. 
Table 7 provides a first analysis of the data. We divide the sample into two groups 
according to whether any labor restructuring took place in a state-owned enterprise. The table 
shows the value of the mean and median of the share adjusted net privatization prices of the 
firms, the difference in net price means and medians, and the t-statistic and z-statistics associated 
with that difference in means and medians, respectively. Most labor restructuring policies yield 
statistically significant differences in means and medians. Interestingly, this finding does not 
provide support to the idea that governments should pursue labor restructuring—quite the 
opposite. Governments that restructured labor in state-owned enterprises before privatization 
obtained significantly lower privatization prices compared to those that did not. This finding, 
however, does not consider that other prior restructuring policies may be playing a role and, in 
particular, does not take into account endogeneity problems. In fact, it may be argued that the 
firms that downsize are the ones that need to do so, as they are the worst performers. According 
to these results, only labor restructuring through pay cuts yields increased prices, and even in this 
case the difference in means is only weakly statistically significant.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
19 In Latin America, Africa, and Industrial Countries, 82, 79, and 79 percent of the firms did some labor force 
downsizing, respectively. 
  133.  Downsizing and Privatization Prices 
 
In this section we present regression analysis on the link between labor restructuring policies and 
privatization prices. Net privatization prices are regressed against a set of variables that has been 
classified in four groups. The first is firm and privatization characteristics. We use a dummy that 
equals one when net total liabilities are greater than zero for the average of the three years prior 
to privatization. Similarly, we include a set of dummy variables to take the economic sector into 
account.
20 We also include the percentage of shares sold, a variable that takes into account 
whether foreign participation was allowed, as well the type of privatization sale, in particular, 
public offerings and direct sales. The second group includes firm labor characteristics, as 
reflected by the presence of unions and the existence of strikes and related physical protests 
during the three years leading up to privatization. The third group reflects labor restructuring 
policies applied prior to privatization, namely employment guarantees, pay cuts and labor cuts, 
including whether such downsizing was compulsory or voluntary, and whether there is any skill, 
age, or gender bias in the labor downsizing operation. Finally, the fourth group includes country-
specific macroeconomic variables, specifically the gross domestic product and the rate of 
inflation.
21 
The first column in Table 8 presents our basic results. We first use a simple ordinary least 
squares approach and assume that labor restructuring policies are exogenous. In this case, sixteen 
observations are excluded from our sample as they represent failed operations, that is, 
privatizations of state-owned enterprises that for one reason or another did not find a buyer and 
consequently have no privatization price. With respect to the first group of variables, firm and 
industry characteristics, we find, as expected, a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient 
in the case of net liabilities. We also find that the coefficient of the share of the firm that was 
privatized yields a negative and statistically significant link with privatization prices. The result 
suggests that an additional 10 percent of privatized share decreases privatization price by 3 
percent. Additionally, foreign participation yields a positive and statistically significant sign at 1 
                                                       
20 These dummies are not reported in the regressions. We considered the following economic sectors: (i) mining 
(metallic minerals and nonmetallic minerals); (ii) manufacturing (canned fish and seafood; sugar mills; tobacco 
products; beverages; textiles, clothing and leather; wood; paper and printing; heavy machinery; transportation 
equipment); (iii) services (hotels and restaurants; land and sea transportation; communications; and recreation); and 
(iv) others (land; unclassified firms). 
  14percent. This result implies that allowing foreign participation is associated with a 32-percent 
increase in privatization prices. Public offerings yield a positive and statistically significant sign 
and are associated with a 17-percent increase in the privatization price. Direct sales yield a 
negative and statistically insignificant sign (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997, and López-de-
Silanes, 1997).  
With respect to labor characteristics, we find that the presence of unions in the three years 
prior to privatization is associated with a privatization price 24 percent lower, as the sign of the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent. We also find that strikes and other 
forms of physical protest, though positive, are not statistically linked with privatization prices.
22 
These findings are similar to those in López-de-Silanes (1997) for the case of Mexico.
23  
When focusing on the set of labor policy variables, our key set of interest, we find that 
the downsizing summary measure is associated with a privatization price 8 percent lower, as the 
sign of the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent. Again this is under the 
assumption of exogeneity and when excluding failed privatizations. Similarly, we find that using 
employment guarantees prior to privatization is linked with a privatization price 16 percent 
lower, as the corresponding sign is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent. If 
maximizing revenues is the sole objective of policymakers, applying this kind of policy is self-
defeating.
24 Pay cuts prior to privatization yield the expected negative sign, although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
A problem, however, with the empirical results above is that they do not take into 
account potential endogeneity issues. Governments try to restructure the labor force of the state-
owned enterprises before the sale in order to raise the privatization price. The negative sign may 
be simply a reflection that the firms in the worst shape are shedding labor. For instance, if the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Since the country-specific macroeconomic variables capture any specific variation among countries in our sample, 
country dummies are excluded when using them and vice versa. Results do not change. Also, other macroeconomic 
variables were considered and the results are very similar. 
22 Since unions and strikes are relatively highly correlated it is not a surprise that the latter yields a statistically 
insignificant coefficient. When excluding the unions variable or constructing a combined “unions-strikes” variable 
the signs are negative and statistically significant at 1 percent. 
23 They are consistent with the political view of labor restructuring by which unions may try to block privatizations, 
which is costly to buyers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Lopéz-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996). 
24 However, governments frequently have multiple, and often contradictory, objectives. The value of this finding 
from a policy perspective is, perhaps, to make policymakers aware that there appears to be a trade-off between 
objectives and their cost. 
  15unobservable characteristics of a firm are positively correlated with the presence of strong 
unions, the government may be particularly interested in dismantling such unions.  
Using a method by López-de-Silanes (1997) we apply a two-step instrumental variables 
approach by estimating a non-linear reduced-form equation that describes the probability that a 
particular labor restructuring policy will be implemented.
25 The instruments used are classified 
into two groups: firm-level determinants and macroeconomic-level determinants. The firm-level 
variables included are: (1) a dummy variable to reflect whether a leading agent bank organized 
privatization, (2) the involvement of a Ministry of Finance or Economy before privatization, (3) 
the political affiliation of unions, (4) whether the country was undertaking structural reform 
during privatization of the firm, and (5) sectoral dummies. The macroeconomic variables 
considered are: (1) the average growth rate in the three years prior to privatization, (2) the legal 
origin of the country, and (3) the average degree of openness in the three years prior to 
privatization. In general, these variables correspond with the micro and macro variables 
employed in López-de-Silanes (1997). As required in this procedure, none of these variables is 
statistically significant when included in the price equation. Also, the F-statistic for the excluded 
instruments is statistically significant at 1 percent. Appendix 1A-1D shows the first stage probit 
for some of the labor downsizing measures used in this research.
26 The set of instruments used 
for each labor restructuring variable is shown in Table 9. 
The second column in Table 8 presents our findings when correcting for endogeneity 
using the above method.
27 The results for privatization and firm characteristics are, essentially, 
identical to the non-instrumented results above. Furthermore, our findings for labor 
characteristics are very similar to our previous findings, as the presence of unions is associated 
with a privatization price 24 percent lower. With respect to our key group of variables of interest, 
labor policies, we find that employment guarantees are negatively linked with net privatization 
prices, and the link is statistically significant. However, we find that when controlling for 
endogeneity, neither pay cuts nor downsizing appears to significantly change privatization 
                                                       
25 These variables are excluded instruments, as they are not included in the privatization price equation. These 
instruments have very low statistical power when included directly in the price equation, but they are highly 
correlated with the labor restructuring actions of the firm, as shown by applying F-statistics to test for the joint 
hypothesis that they are all equal to zero (López-de-Silanes, 1997). 
26 Because of space considerations, the first stage for all the other labor restructuring measures and for the firm labor 
conditions are not presented. We would be happy to provide them upon request. 
  16prices. That is, while the conventional wisdom has it that prospective buyers will prefer 
governments to scale back labor before privatization, our results so far show that that may not be 
the most appropriate policy.
28   
A key question remains: To what extent is it necessary to carry out labor restructuring in 
order to sell state-owned enterprises?  After all, there are at least three incentives that could 
cause firms to be over-restructured before privatization. First, corrupt managers of state-owned 
firms may want to take a “last cut,” for instance, by colluding with labor unions before “letting 
go” of their positions of power. The same applies to high-ranking government officials.  Second, 
investment bankers involved in the process might want to restructure in hopes of attaining higher 
fees. Third, government agencies may want to restructure in order to “look good” and show that 
they are doing their job.  However, the evidence in this paper points to the fact that it is not true 
that if the firm is restructured its chances of being sold increase. This is consistent with López-
de-Silanes (1997). In fact, when analyzing our data on the 16 failed privatizations in which 
preparation for privatization occurred but the sale ultimately did not take place, we find that 




4.  Voluntary and Targeted Downsizing and Adverse Selection 
 
Governments frequently intervene in the labor downsizing process by using voluntary 
downsizing schemes as well as skill, age, or gender benchmarks. The inclusion of voluntary 
schemes is shown in columns 3-4 of Table 8. In fact, voluntary downsizing schemes usually 
account for a very large percentage of total labor downsizing (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999).
30 
The reason for their popularity is simple. Such schemes are not politically costly, they are 
attractive to workers and thus bypass the power of unions, and they can be relatively easily 
                                                                                                                                                                           
27 All the coefficients of economic sectors have positive signs and are not statistically significant in the ordinary 
least square regression. However, they become statistically significant at 10 percent when including failed 
privatizations. 
28 These results are actually similar to those in López-de-Silanes (1997) regarding labor restructuring in Mexico. In 
fact, he finds that labor cuts yield a negative sign at 10 percent statistical significance when not controlling for 
endogeneity, and a positive sign also at 10 percent statistical significance. Neither result is robust. 
29 Admittedly, this is a small sample. Still, when running probits where 1 equals firm sold, and zero otherwise, with 
the same controls used as in the price regressions, we find that either the labor restructuring variables are not 
statistically significant or, if so, they have the “wrong” sign. That is, in several instances downsizing measures 
applied prior to privatization decrease the probability of the firm being sold.  Results are available upon request. 
  17designed and administered by governments (Rama, 1999; Jeon and Laffont, 1999). We find that 
regardless of the econometric method, this variable yields a negative and statistically significant 
sign.
31 In fact, our results suggest that voluntary downsizing is associated with about a 12 percent 
decrease in privatization prices. Interestingly, this negative link may be a reflection of adverse 
selection, as workers with the best outside prospects will tend to leave and those with the worst 
outside perspectives will tend to stay. The human capital of the firm then deteriorates and the 
privatization price will reflect this. A loss of know-how associated with short-run post-
privatization efficiency problems may have occurred and, at an extreme, this may be linked with 
permanent damage to the productive structure of the firm.  Consequently, dismissing workers 
that the new owners would rather have kept is unlikely to add value to the firm and could reduce 
the privatization price. In other words, despite the fact that voluntary separation programs are 
politically palatable and thus, attractive to policymakers, the findings here show that, as 
predicted by theory (Kahn, 1985, Diwan, 1994, and Jeon and Laffont, 1999), such downsizing 
mechanisms do not help governments adequately identify those workers who are less productive. 
In fact, governments will tend to separate the wrong workers from their jobs, possibly at an 
excessively high cost (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999, and Rama, 1999). 
Governments also try to manage the downsizing process by focusing on three downsizing 
categories that are particularly predominant: age-biased, skill-biased, and female-biased 
downsizing. Table 10 shows our findings using these measures. Controlling for endogeneity, we 
find that downsizing using age as a benchmark results in a decrease of around 10 percent in 
privatization prices, as the sign of the corresponding coefficients is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 percent (column 2).
32 On the other hand, our findings suggest that skill-biased 
downsizing is positive but barely significant with respect to privatization prices when controlling 
for endogeneity (column 2 of Table 10). According to this finding, using skills as a benchmark 
                                                                                                                                                                           
30 In our sample, for instance, voluntary downsizing accounts for about 41 percent of total downsizing as shown in 
Table 5. 
31 The statistical significance ranges from 1 percent in the simple ordinary least squares case to 5 percent in the 
instrumental variables case. 
32 In the case of age-biased downsizing, ordinary least squares coefficients are statistically significant at 1 percent 
(column 1). In the case of administered downsizing by skills, ordinary least squares yield similar signs as in the 
instrumental variables methods, but the coefficients are not statistically significant in the former. As we argue above, 
and as López-de-Silanes (1997) shows, endogeneity is a problem.  
  18indicator may increase prices by 13 percent. When controlling for endogeneity, the female bias 
variable is negative but statistically insignificant.
33  
The results above further suggest that adverse selection may be an issue in downsizing 
programs prior to privatization, since both voluntary downsizing and age-biased downsizing 
appear to reduce privatization prices. Workers that are dismissed using these methods may not 
necessarily be the least productive or least skilled, since an inadequate identification of workers 
may have taken place. Furthermore, the fact that skill-biased downsizing yields a positive, 
though marginally statistical significant, link with privatization prices appears to provide some 
corroborating evidence along these same lines, especially if one believes that skills are correlated 
with productivity.
34 
Classifying targeted downsizing as voluntary or compulsory provides further analysis. 
Doing so yields two additional categories: voluntary-targeted downsizing and compulsory-
targeted downsizing. Furthermore, as before, voluntary or compulsory targeted downsizing may 
be age-biased, skilled-biased or female-biased driven, which results in three voluntary-targeted 
downsizing categories and three compulsory-targeted downsizing categories (see Table 4). 
Voluntary-targeted results are shown in Table 11. The classic example of voluntary age-biased 
downsizing is early retirement programs.
35 As this table shows, voluntary age-biased downsizing 
is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent when using the non-instrumented method, and 
negative and statistically significant at 5 percent in the two-step procedure. This result further 
confirms the idea that adverse selection is a problem when applying administered or targeted 
downsizing in the public sector, as older workers are not necessarily the least productive ones, 
and the best older workers may have the greatest incentives to leave first. Moreover, similar to 
the case above, the voluntary skill-biased downsizing variable is positive but it is insignificant.
36  
                                                       
33 In fact, this variable is never statistically significant and does change signs depending on the methodology 
employed. People admitting to gender bias were few. This is hardly surprising, as people may not be truthful for fear 
of retaliation. Also, certain legal and societal considerations may be at issue. 
34 In fact, the link between education and productivity is widely accepted in the economics of education literature. 
35 In the skill-biased category finding a “clean” example is somewhat more difficult. After all, who would want to 
take a voluntary test when she knows it may be used to fire her? Somewhat like pleading the Fifth Amendment in 
the United States, though, where for all practical purposes invoking legal protection is frequently associated with a 
presumption of guilt, not taking a “suggested exam” may expose the worker to retaliation. While one may argue that 
this mechanism is not really voluntary, from the perspective of the firms, ministries, and privatization agencies 
(from whom we mainly obtained the data), the explicit method is clearly understood as voluntary. 
36 High correlation with the voluntary age-biased variable may be a problem, as 14 out of the 20 observations that 
are positive are also voluntary age-biased (Table 4). 
  19Table 11 also shows results when using compulsory targeted variables. As the name 
implies, in this category there is no choice for the worker. Firms simply choose the workers that 
will stay and those that will leave using age, skills (for example, when managers in each division 
choose the most skilled ones), or gender, as a retrenchment reference. Though the signs in the 
compulsory age-biased variable and compulsory skill-biased variable are similar to our previous 
results, the age coefficient, unlike the voluntary- targeted case, is now statistically insignificant. 
This result is consistent with the fact that voluntary programs are theoretically expected to 
produce somewhat larger adverse selection problems than compulsory ones (Jeon and Laffont, 
1999; Levy and McLean, 1997; Kahn, 1985). In fact, while in voluntary age-biased programs it 
may be expected that more productive workers will leave rather than less productive workers, in 
mass compulsory programs it is reasonable to expect that both the good and the bad will leave. 
The net effect will tend to cancel out.
37  
In summary, so far we have found that when controlling for endogeneity, labor 
retrenchment and pay cuts do not have any bearing on net privatization prices. Employment 
guarantee programs affect prices negatively, as their implementation lowers privatization prices 
by 16 percent, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, our results show that, if anything, targeted labor 
downsizing appears to produce a selection of the wrong group of workers, the less productive 
ones, reflected in the fact that voluntary and age-biased downsizing reduce net privatization 
prices between 10 and 15 percent, ceteris paribus. This is further suggested by the fact that 
voluntary age-biased retrenchment appears to be the driving force behind the negative link 
between voluntary downsizing and prices, which suggests that there may be incentives for the 
most productive older workers to leave first. In fact, while governments resort to a different array 
of productivity-identification methods in order to select which workers to fire and which to keep, 
the evidence above shows that their application results in the opposite effect of the one originally 
desired, that is, lower privatization prices instead of higher ones.  Buyers may not be willing to 
pay higher prices since, when the best workers leave, rebuilding the labor force can be very 
costly and take considerable time. Permanent loss of know-how and damage to the productive 
                                                       
37 On the other hand, in some specifications we find a positive link between compulsory skill-biased measures and 
privatization prices. Though not a very robust result, it appears that compulsory exams, as a relatively good 
objective measure of productivity, in some cases may help keep the more productive workers. This may be reflected 
in an increase in privatization prices. Still, from a practical perspective, this policy prescription is highly 
controversial, as its applicability will clearly depend on the political climate of the country.  In fact, countries where 
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factors of production. 
 
5.  A Silver Bullet: Re-Hires after Privatization 
 
According to the results above, a negative link between labor restructuring and privatization 
prices is not puzzling. The reason why prospective buyers may want to pass on the opportunity 
of having governments deal with bloated labor forces, severance packages, and simply cleaning 
house through worker dismissal appears to be linked with the fact that the resulting human 
capital loss can be considerable.  Rebuilding human capital in the form of searching and training 
can be a very slow and not necessarily successful process, especially in those instances where 
firm-specific know-how was lost. Consequently, privatization prices may be penalized. 
As much as adverse selection reasonably appears to be a factor in why buyers may not be 
willing to bid higher prices for state-owned enterprises, it could also be the case that some other 
unobserved but correlated factor produces a negative link between labor downsizing and 
privatization prices. The question is whether there is a measure that can provide strong evidence 
of the presence of adverse selection in the downsizing process prior to privatization. In short, is 
there a silver bullet? 
In the context above, notice that firms can pursue the option of re-hiring the workers that 
were let go prior to privatization. If successful, firms could save substantial time and effort in 
search and training. Re-hires provide a very good measure of the quality of the downsizing 
process and allow a better understanding of the pervasiveness of adverse selection during 
retrenchment.
38 After all, why would a firm need to re-hire a worker who was deemed 
expendable a relatively short time ago?
 Unless, of course, the retrenchment before privatization 
was badly done. In fact, nearly 44 percent of firms did some re-hiring after privatization, of 
which Latin America was the most active, with upwards of 50 percent, and Asia the least active 
with a little more than 21 percent.
39 This is shown in Figure 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
skill-biased programs have been used rather successfully did so under not-so-democratic regimes. Two examples in 
our sample are Chile in the 1980s (Pinochet) and Peru in the 1990s (Fujimori). 
38 While Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) introduced a similar concept, we are the first to apply rigorous econometric 
methods using re-hires. We work with re-hires up to 18 months after privatization. We test shorter periods (12 
months) and longer ones (24 months), and the empirical results do not vary. 
39 According to our data nearly 70 percent of firms did some re-hiring after privatization. This number is misleading 
since total increases in personnel are due not only to re-hires, but also to hires of workers not previously associated 
  21In theory, if firms were able to fully re-hire at zero cost all the good workers that were 
previously fired, privatization prices would not be penalized. However, more often than not, that 
is not the case and, in practice, a negative link between retrenchment and prices will likely 
remain. The reasons are simple. First, since the best workers are the ones that leave first, chances 
are they would already be employed elsewhere and have no intention or incentive to come back 
to the old firm. Second, additional incentives are needed to re-hire workers after privatization, 
which will likely increase the cost of re-hiring. It is not easy to lure good workers back, 
especially given their potential alternatives outside. The offering of additional pay, perks, or 
higher position may be necessary. Third, legal considerations may not allow fired workers to be 
re-hired.
40 Finally, workers move and are not easily reachable, which again will increase costs. If 
firms are willing to re-hire workers despite potentially increased costs both in monetary and 
administrative terms, it is probably because such workers are worth it. These reasons further 
support the validity of re-hires as an indicator of the quality of the downsizing process prior to 
privatization. 
From the findings in the previous section, it is clear that, with respect to privatization 
prices, some downsizing measures are worse than others. Voluntary downsizing measures and, in 
particular, age-biased measures, are particularly bad, while some skill-biased measures appear to 
be relatively less harmful or at least irrelevant. If adverse selection is the culprit, it is expected 
that the basic link between the outcome on prices of the particular downsizing measure 
considered and the likelihood of re-hiring maintains a similar pattern. In other words, if 
voluntary downsizing is indeed linked with adverse selection, as suggested from the results with 
prices, the probability of re-hiring should be high. On the other hand, if skill-biased downsizing 
adequately distinguishes between more and less productive workers, then the probability of re-
hiring should be lower.  
A first approach in showing that the degree of re-hires is an ideal measure of the quality 
of the labor downsizing process prior to privatization consists of studying its relationship with 
voluntary downsizing as an explanatory variable. Using re-hires as the dependent variable, we 
find that the coefficient of the voluntary downsizing variable is positive and statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                           
with the firm. While the latter may be attributed to the natural progression of privatized firms as an ongoing concern, 
the former may reasonably be linked with the quality of the downsizing prior to privatization.   
40 This is particularly true in cases where public sector participation in the privatized firm is maintained. This 
legislation is usually enacted because of revolving door and double-dipping issues. 
  22significant at 5 percent. That is, voluntary downsizing before privatization increases the 
probability of re-hiring workers after privatization.
41  Results are shown in the upper panel of 
Table 12, specification 1. In fact, since typical voluntary downsizing mechanisms are 
theoretically flawed with adverse selection problems, this finding is not surprising (Jeon and 
Laffont, 1999, and Kahn, 1985).  As mentioned above, workers who leave voluntarily are usually 
those who have the highest chances of obtaining work outside in less time. They are also the 
ones who are most able to find jobs better-matched to their abilities and skills outside of the 
public sector and quasi-public sector.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that the incidence of re-hires after privatization 
does not necessarily reflect the presence of voluntary downsizing, but rather the presence of high 
labor firing costs and related rigidities. Potential buyers may want to take advantage of 
regulations that allow for a “clean slate” approach so that state-owned enterprises are permitted 
to have as many workers as possible retrenched before privatization, only to be re-employed by 
the privatized firm. In this way, high labor costs are avoided while the human capital of the firm 
is preserved.  To test this idea, two labor cost measures are employed. The first is an indicator of 
labor rigidities as measured by the extent to which the country has signed agreements with the 
International Labor Organization. This variable is defined as the cumulative number of ILO 
conventions ratified by the country at the time of privatization and is based on legal documents 
as compiled by Rama and Artecona (2001).   
The second variable is an index of labor firing costs constructed from legislation in 
Heckman and Pagés (2001). This measure summarizes the tenure-severance pay profile using a 
common set of dismissal probabilities across countries and computes the expected future costs, at 
the time a worker is hired, of dismissing her in the future (also see Table 1).
42 We find that the 
coefficients of both labor rigidity measures are negative but statistically insignificant using re-
hires measures. This is also shown in the upper panel in Table 12. It appears that labor rigidities 
do not change the probabilities of re-hires when controlling for voluntary downsizing.  
Re-hiring after privatization occurs not only at the firm level, but also in some instances 
from the very same departments or areas from which the workers had been previously fired (see 
                                                       
41 That is, when controlling for shares sold, sectoral dummies, macroeconomic controls (rate of growth, rate of 
inflation, initial gross domestic product). 
  23Figure 4). When exploring this more restrictive measure of re-hires as the dependent variable we 
find that the coefficient of the voluntary downsizing variable is not statistically significant. This 
is shown in the lower panel in Table 12.
43 Additionally, and similar to the re-hires variable, labor 
rigidity measures yield negative and statistically insignificant coefficients with respect to the re-
hires-same variable. This is also shown in the lower panel in Table 12. 
Voluntary downsizing is only part of the story. In fact, re-hires after privatizations are 
closely linked with targeting sometimes applied before privatization according to skills, age, and 
gender. This is shown in the first column in the upper panel of Table 13. Using re-hires as the 
dependent variable, we find that the age-targeted retrenchment variable yields a positive and 
statistically significant sign at 1 percent. Age-targeted retrenchment prior to privatization 
increases the probability of re-hiring by a huge 30 percent after privatization. On the other hand, 
the skill-targeted coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent. Skill targeting 
decreases the probability that firms will employ re-hires after privatization by 20 percent. 
Finally, the female-biased retrenchment coefficient is positive but it is not statistically 
significant. These results are quite consistent with our findings regarding net privatization prices. 
In fact, they strongly suggest that adverse selection may be a problem, as voluntary downsizing 
increases prices, but age-biased downsizing reduces prices and increases the probability of re-
hiring after privatization, and skill-biased downsizing marginally increases net privatization 
prices and reduces the probability of re-hiring after privatization. Even more revealing, the 
results above hold when using the more restrictive re-hiring measure. These findings are shown 
in the lower panel of Table 13. Again, the corresponding coefficient for the age-biased variable 
is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent while the coefficient of the skill-biased 
variable is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent.
44  
Similar to the case with voluntary downsizing, the incidence of re-hires after privatization 
may not necessarily reflect poor management, but rather high labor firing costs and related 
                                                                                                                                                                           
42 Since the Heckman and Pagés (2001) sample is relatively limited, we also use an alternative measure suggested by 
them—legal origin. They show that French legal origin is very highly correlated with labor separation costs. In fact, 
we find very similar results. We would be happy to provide these additional estimations upon request. 
43 Data appears to be the likely culprit of this result as only 11 percent of the sample was re-hired to the same 
department or area, compared to more than 44 percent that were simply re-hired. Furthermore, Asia and the 
Transition Economies did practically no re-hiring to the same department. As mentioned above, another explanation 
may be related with the fact that enticing the best workers back after having them fired entails an additional cost.  
Additional pay or promotions may be necessary. In this context, the fact that the more restrictive measure of re-hires 
after privatization is not significantly linked with voluntary downsizing before privatization is not surprising. 
44 As before the coefficient of the female-biased variable is positive but not statistically significant. 
  24rigidities. To explore this issue, we run probit regressions using the same two measures of labor 
costs used above. This is also shown in Table 13. When using ILO conventions as an additional 
explanatory variable, we find that that control is negative but statistically insignificant. Excessive 
labor costs and regulations do not seem to be a determinant of the probability of re-hires after 
privatization. Moreover, the signs and statistical significance of the age and skills variables do 
not change. The age-bias variable is always positive and is statistically significant at 1 percent in 
both  re-hires and re-hires-same. Age-biased downsizing prior to privatization increases the 
probability of re-hires by 36 percent and increases the probability of re-hires to the same 
department by 16 percent.  
On the other hand, the skill-bias variable is always negative, implying a lower probability 
of re-employment as it is statistically significant at 5 percent for both re-hires in general and re-
hires to the same department or area in the firm. Skill-biased downsizing prior to privatization is 
linked with a lower probability of re-employment that ranges between 12 percent (re-hires-same) 
and 22 percent (general re-hires). Very similar results are obtained when using the Heckman-
Pagés firing costs variable instead. In fact, this variable is negative but statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that high firing costs do not seem to have a bearing on the probability of re-hires. The 
signs of the skill-bias and age-bias variables are maintained, as well as their corresponding 
statistical significance.
45  
Finally, analogous to the analysis performed with privatization prices, Tables 14 and 15 
provide evidence related to voluntary targeting and compulsory targeting, respectively.
46 
According to our results in Table 14, voluntary age-biased downsizing increases the probability 
of re-hiring between 23 percent and 34 percent, as the corresponding coefficients in the three 
specifications presented are positive and statistically significant.
47 This finding provides further 
evidence of adverse selection. On the other hand, voluntary skill-biased downsizing yields the 
expected negative sign as before, but in this case the corresponding coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, Table 15 shows that compulsory age-biased downsizing is weakly linked 
with a higher probability of re-hiring, as the corresponding signs are positive and statistically 
                                                       
45 We also use data for temporary workers, defined as those workers who were downsized prior to privatization but 
re-hired after privatization on a temporary basis, presumably in order to take advantage of lower labor costs. As 
expected, we find that voluntary downsizing increases the probability of temporary hiring.  
46 Insufficient observations did not allow us to provide further evidence using re-hires same as the dependent 
variable for these two tables. 
47 However, statistical significance using the Heckman-Pagés labor firing costs only reaches 10 percent. 
  25significant at 10 percent only when excluding labor rigidity measures. This is consistent with the 
“canceling out” idea described in the case of prices. On the other hand, compulsory skill-biased 
downsizing prior to privatization appears to lower the probability of re-hiring after privatization, 
regardless of the specification.  This is consistent with the fact that in some specifications we 
obtain a positive and statistically significant link between that variable and privatization prices 
(see footnote 37). 
In summary, our findings with respect to re-hiring policies are consistent with the adverse 
selection hypothesis in labor restructuring by the government before privatization. What 
governments do before privatization does have a direct bearing on how firms behave after 
privatization. Voluntary downsizing is associated with a 16-30 percent higher probability of re-
hiring workers that were fired prior to privatization. Age-biased downsizing yields a higher 
probability of re-hiring workers, which in the case of voluntary age-biased downsizing reaches 
around 34 percent and in the case of compulsory age-biased downsizing around 12 percent— 
sometimes even re-hiring workers to the very same departments. The one exception to these 
results is skill-based downsizing, which in some specifications leads to significantly lower re-
hiring rates by private firms. 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Despite its importance, labor has probably been the single least addressed issue in privatization 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). There is ambivalence with respect to the optimal policy approach 
to labor restructuring in privatization processes as reflected by the recommendations of 
development agencies around the world. In fact, such institutions have had a difficult time taking 
a position on whether or not it is a good idea to restructure a firm and, in particular, how to deal 
with labor force changes prior to privatization. Early advice called for labor restructuring prior to 
privatization under the premise that governments are better able to cushion any financial blow to 
displaced workers, mainly through safety nets (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). Subsequent 
recommendations called for a less meddlesome approach by discriminating between large firms 
and smaller ones. It was suggested that smaller firms with relatively little overstaffing be sold 
with essentially no labor restructuring, under the logic that such a decision should be left to the 
new owners who would be in better position to choose which workers they would like to retain 
or dismiss (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992). A final view came later when prior restructuring in 
  26privatization, including the labor area, was found to be associated with lower net privatization 
prices paid by buyers (López-de-Silanes, 1997). 
This paper is the first to provide a formal cross-country analysis of the effects of a 
detailed list of labor restructuring measures before privatization to provide guidance for those 
countries still embarking on the privatization process. The lack of information on what happens 
to the labor force during the privatization process has exacerbated the fears and concerns of 
workers and governments, and delayed privatization in several countries (Kikeri, 1999). We 
address some policy concerns by testing several competing theories that aim to answer the 
following key question: Should governments restructure labor before privatization, as measured 
by privatization prices? While, as a general principle, dismissing redundant workers should 
increase the privatization price, in practice governments have a very difficult time identifying the 
genuinely redundant workers as asymmetric information problems remain. Firing the wrong 
workers may even reduce the privatization price. 
Our data allow us to analyze the impact of labor restructuring measures not only on 
prices, but also on the re-hiring policies followed by firms after they are privatized. The benefit 
of such data is that we are able to say something about the management quality of retrenchment 
policies followed by governments around the world, and, in particular, we are able to investigate 
adverse selection issues. In fact, we find that overall labor retrenchment does not significantly 
impact privatization prices; if anything, voluntary retrenchment has a negative impact on net 
prices, suggesting a potential problem of adverse selection. Through a detailed analysis of 
various targeting policies, the paper also shows that government administration of the 
downsizing process may result in adverse selection, reflected in the re-hiring of the same 
workers after privatization. 
Politically palatable downsizing mechanisms such as voluntary downsizing programs are 
very costly in terms of adverse selection. More elaborate mechanisms, such as compulsory skill 
programs, are politically very difficult to implement, but appear to be better at distinguishing the 
more productive workers from the less productive ones. In fact, we did find that it might be 
possible for governments to achieve some positive results through managing the process by 
using a skill-focused retrenchment. This type of policy is associated with lower probability rates 
of re-hiring of the same workers after privatization. However, it is also associated with negative 
political effects, as workers may find it too aggressive and react negatively towards the whole 
  27privatization process. The fact that the political costs of this type of program are higher suggests 
that there may be some not easily observable or measurable firm characteristics that could 
explain the marginally positive results of these policies. Another reason for this result is the 
possibility that the level of documentation and design of this type of program simply makes it 
more palatable to buyers. The political difficulties of using such a policy and the problems it 
might cause in terms of the overall objective of achieving privatization should be considered.  
In summary, governments should think long and hard before they restructure labor forces 
in preparation for privatization. The political consequences may be dire and the positive impact 
on privatization prices non-existent. Furthermore, the data on re-hiring policies shows that firms 
in which retrenchment takes place may ultimately lose some of their most valuable workers. 
While a qualified “do not intervene” appears to be the safest bet with respect to labor 
retrenchment before privatization, another policy alternative might be to set up a social safety net 
or labor reallocation program before privatization, and then let the new private owners decide 
who is redundant and who is not. Setting up the program before privatization may help with the 
political viability of the process and letting the new owners manage the retrenchment could help 
avoid adverse selection. 
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           Source: Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects 308 firms. 
 


















































   1/ Includes land and unclassified firms.  
   Source: Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects 308 firms. 
 
 



















Source: Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects the 225 














The net real value of the nominal price of sale in U.S dollars after all privatization and 
restructuring costs are taken into account adjusted by the percentage of company shares 
sold, and divided by total sales before privatization. 
Sales  The net real value of the three-year average of firm sales before privatization denominated 
in U.S dollars. 
Net total liabilities  Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total liabilities are greater than zero up to three years prior 




Ministry of Finance or 
Economy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ministry of finance or economy was responsible for that 
company, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign participation  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Share sold  Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization. 
Type of sale  Dummy variable equal to 1 to take into account method of privatization sale. Two dummies 
are considered to account for initial public offering and direct (non-competitive) sales 
respectively, and 0 otherwise (reflecting other methods such as purchases by employees, 
joint ventures, or secondary offerings). 
Agent bank  Dummy variable equal to 1 if leading agent bank organized privatization process. Leading 
agent bank is defined as bank that organized most privatizations in the country at the time 
of our research. Agent banks are in charge of obtaining information on the state-owned 
enterprise, suggesting restructuring measures, and organizing the sale itself. 
 
Labor Characteristics 
Unions  Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had unions up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 
otherwise. 
Political affiliation of 
unions 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if political affiliation of union is the same as the political party 
linked with the ruling government at the time of privatization, and 0 otherwise. 
Strikes  Dummy variable equal to 1 if there were any protest, picketing or strikes prior to 
privatization, and 0 otherwise. 
Labor Policies 
Downsizing   Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm undertook any downsizing of the labor force up to three 
years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise. Downsizing may be classified as voluntary or 
compulsory, and may be targeted according to age (age-biased downsizing, skills (skill-
biased downsizing), gender (female-biased downsizing), or may be neutral (no particular 
group targeted). 
Voluntary downsizing  Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any kind of voluntary downsizing of the labor force 
three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise. Voluntary downsizing is defined as any non-
compulsory, worker-based decision downsizing. Typically severance packages, pension 
enhancements, and other benefits are offered to incentivize workers to leave the firm. 
Employment guarantee Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any promise of employment guarantee up to three 
years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise. 
Pay cut  Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any pay cut to the salary or wage of the worker 
three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise. 
Re-hires  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the privatized firm re-hired previously fired workers (up to 
three years prior to privatization) after privatization, 0 otherwise. 
Re-hires same  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the privatized firm re-hired previously fired workers (up to 
three years prior to privatization) and placed the worker in the same department or are from 
which he was originally fired, 0 otherwise. 
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Law origin  Legal origin of the country in which company is geographically based. Five possible legal 
origins are considered: English common law; French civil code; German commercial code; 
Scandinavian commercial code; and Socialist laws (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1998). 
Gross domestic 
product 
Gross Domestic Product  (US$ PPP) in logs. Average of the three years prior privatization 
(World Bank, 2001a). 
Inflation  Average rate of inflation in the country three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Openness  Average sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001a). 
OECD  Dummy equal to 1 if the country is an OECD country, 0 otherwise. 
Economic Growth  Average rate of growth of the country three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a). 
Fiscal Deficits  Average fiscal deficits as a percentage of gross domestic product three years prior to 
privatization (World Bank, 2001a). 
ILO conventions  Cumulative number of International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions ratified by the 
country at the time of privatization. Based on legal documents (Rama and Artecona, 2001). 
Labor firing costs  Measure that summarizes the tenure-severance pay profile using a common set of dismissal 
probabilities across countries. The measure computes the expected future cost, at the time a 
worker is hired, of dismissing her in the future due to unfavorable economic conditions. 
The index is constructed to include only firing costs that affect firms' decisions at the 
margin. It includes the cost of providing statutory advance notice and severance pay 
conditional on each possible level of tenure that a worker can attain in the future. Measure 
thus reflects marginal costs of dismissing full-time indefinite workers (Heckman and Pages, 
2001). 
Structural Reform  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the privatization process took place in a context of structural 
reform, 0 otherwise. 
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  Number  Percentage of sales
Firms in our final sample  308  97.21 
Firms that supplied incomplete information  25  1.04 
Firms merged and keep no independent records  19  0.12 
Firms that were liquidated and no longer exist 22  0.78 
Firms that denied or refused to give information 26  0.85 
All Privatized Firms (1982-2000) 400 100.00   
 
This table breaks our world sample between 1982 and 2000 into two groups. For each group we provide the number 
of firms and the percentage of pre-privatization sales in the total.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
 Variable Obs Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
Firm Characteristics: 
Net Privatization Prices/sales  308 0.587  0.609  3.228  0.000  1.367
Sales 308 1.415  0.140  3.167  0.00 21.991
Net total liabilities  308 0.432  0.000  0.496  0.000  1.000
Mining 308 0.143  0.000  0.350  0.00 1.000
Industry 308 0.231  0.000  0.422  0.00 1.000
Services 308 0.558  1.000  0.497  0.000  1.000
Privatization Characteristics: 
Ministry of Finance  308 0.449  0.000  0.498  0.000  1.000
Foreign participation  308 0.682  1.000  0.467  0.000  1.000
Shares sold  308 0.509  0.506  0.282  0.010  1.000
Public offering  308 0.653  1.000  0.477  0.000  1.000
Direct Sale  308 0.198  0.000  0.399  0.000  1.000
Labor Characteristics: 
Unions 308 0.844  1.000  0.363  0.00 1.000
Strikes 308 0.474  0.000  0.500  0.00 1.000
Labor Policies: 
Downsizing 308 0.782  1.000  0.413  0.000  1.000







Age-biased downsizing  308 0.497  0.000  0.501  0.000  1.000
Skill-biased downsizing  308 0.130  0.000  0.337  0.000  1.000
Female-biased downsizing  308 0.058  0.000  0.235  0.000  1.000
Employment  guarantee  308 0.282  0.000  0.451  0.000  1.000
Pay cut  308 0.075  0.000  0.263  0.000  1.000
Re-hiring 225 0.444  0.000  0.498  0.000  1.000
Re-hiring Same  225 0.110  0.000  0.315  0.000  1.000
Country-Specific Variables: 
English common law  308 0.253  0.000  0.436  0.000  1.000
French commercial code  308 0.500  0.500  0.501  0.000  1.000
German commercial code  308 0.117  0.000  0.322  0.000  1.000
Scandinavian commercial code  308 0.019  0.000  0.138  0.000  1.000
Socialist/communist laws  308 0.110  0.000  0.314  0.000  1.000
Gross domestic product  308 25.398  25.452  1.851  19.448  28.856
Inflation 308 109.876  11.485  292.683  0.61 1667.207
Openness 308 31.137  28.158  31.953  0.000  314.588
Economic growth  308 3.028  2.726  3.811  -11.144  21.320
Fiscal deficits  308 -2.580  -2.279  3.475  -14.003  13.629
ILO conventions  221 54.164  52.000  28.883  1.000  123.000

















Neutral Age-biased(*) Skill-biased(*) Female-biased(*) Age-biased(**) Skill-biased(**) Female-biased(**) Neutral
5 82 20 7 71 20 9 62
(5.0%) (82.1%) (20%) (7%) (50.4%) (14.2%) (6.3%) (44.0%)
(*): (**):
#% # %
Age-biased and skill-biased 14 (14) Age-biased and skill-biased 12 (8.5)
Age-biased and female-biased 3 (3) Age-biased and female-biased 5 (3.5)
Skill-biased and female-biased 3 (3) Skill-biased and female-biased 3 (2.1)
Age-biased, skill-biased and Age-biased, skill-biased and





This table shows the decomposition of labor downsizing cases in our sample in terms of cases and percentages (in parentheses). Downsizing may be voluntary or 
compulsory (non-voluntary). Additionally, it may be classified according to its targeting nature as age-biased, skill-biased, and female-biased. Thus, voluntary 
and compulsory downsizing may be targeted. Since one firm may opt to pursue more than one targeted downsizing method, biases do not add up to 100 percent.  
For instance, one firm may concurrently pursue age-biased downsizing and skill-biased downsizing in its downsizing program. The corresponding numbers for 


















            
            
Downsizing 82.2%  58.3% 79.7%  79.2%  76.2%  78.2% 
Voluntary downsizing  32.5%  12.5% 45.3%  28.6%  14.3%  32.5% 
Age-biased downsizing  57.4%  29.2% 54.7%  54.5%  26.6%  49.7% 
Skill-biased downsizing  12.5%  13.9% 9.4%  15.6%  11.9%  13.0% 
Female-biased downsizing  5.0%  8.3%  14.1%  0.0%  4.8%  5.8% 
Employment guarantee  8.4%  20.1% 51.6%  13.0%  52.4%  28.2% 
Pay cut  8.9%  0.0%  1.6%  13.0%  7.1%  7.5% 
            
Sample 32.8%  7.8%  20.8%  25.0%  13.6%  100.0%
Source: Data collected by authors. 
 









a 0.1447 0.1184 1
Female-biased downsizing 0.0643 0.0342 -0.0261 0.1508 1
Employment  guarantee 0.1036 0.027 0.0113 0.0365 0.2126
a 1














a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
 
  42Table 7.  Labor Restructuring and Privatization Prices: Tests of Means and Medians 
 
Downsizing
mean 0.5532 0.7085 -0.1552 3.547
a
median 0.5711 0.7070 -0.1360 3.576
a
Voluntary downsizing
mean 0.4818 0.6376 -0.1557 4.064
a
median 0.4716 0.6259 -0.1543 3.909
a
Age-biased downsizing
mean 0.5265 0.6467 -0.1202 3.320
a
median 0.5136 0.6320 -0.1184 3.184
a
Skill-biased downsizing
mean 0.5616 0.5908 -0.0292 0.534
median 0.6074 0.6157 -0.0083 0.371
Female-biased downsizing
mean 0.3533 0.6015 -0.2482 3.213
a
median 0.3765 0.6150 -0.2385 2.977
a
Employment guarantee
mean 0.4200 0.6496 -0.2296 5.853
a
median 0.3664 0.6508 -0.2844 6.936
a
Pay cut
mean 0.6893 0.5787 0.1106 -1.585
c
median 0.7424 0.6006 0.1417 -1.725
c
T-statistic for change 
in mean
1/











taken        
(a)
 
Table 7 reports mean and median values of the privatization price/sales in the group of firms where the labor 
restructuring measure was taken compared to those firms where it was not. The third column shows the difference in 
mean and medians between the net privatization price of the group of firms that took the measure compared to the 
group that did not. The fourth column reports the resulting t-statistics and z-statistics of the difference in means and 
medians of the two groups respectively. 1/ T-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N’s 2/ Z-test for 
Ho about difference between medians. Unequal N's. (Wilcoxon rank sum). 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 
5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
 
 
  43Table 8. Labor Restructuring and Privatization Prices 
(Dependent variable: Net privatization price/sales) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.- Firm and privatization characteristics:
Net total liabilities -0.0201 -0.0241 -0.0231 -0.0232


















(0.043)     (0.044)     (0.042)     (0.043)    
Direct Sale -0.0094 -0.0118 -0.0086 -0.0038







(0.034)     (0.034)     (0.035)     (0.034)    
Strikes 0.0010 -0.0065 0.0003 0.0062
(0.029)     (0.028)     (0.028)     (0.028)    
3.-  Labor Policies:
Downsizing -0.0587
b -0.0286




(0.028)     (0.021)    





(0.032)     (0.033)     (0.032)     (0.033)    
Pay cut 0.0662 0.0089 0.0708 0.0212
(0.046)     (0.033)     (0.045)     (0.031)    
4.- Macroeconomic Variables:











(0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)    
OECD 0.025      0.0164 0.0112 0.0055






(0.311)     (0.320)     (0.300)     (0.328)    
Observations 292 292 292 292
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.52
F 20.03 19.95 21.67 21.19
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IV Variables IV OLS OLS
 
 
The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after all 
privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale and 
other adjustments are made to the sale contract.  This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold 
and is divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The real value of the resulting 
number as of December 2000 is used. Columns (1) and (3) consider prior restructuring measures and the rest of 
variable as “exogenous” and provide estimates from OLS regressions. Column (2) and (4) show the second stage of 
the two-step procedure in order to account for endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm size 
controls. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c 
significant at 10 percent. 
 
 



























              
Downsizing      Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  4.44
Voluntary downsizing  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  4.12 
Age-biased downsizing    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  3.70 
Skill-biased downsizing    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  3.45 
Female-biased downsizing    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  3.31 
Employment guarantee  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  3.22 
Pay cut  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  3.44 
                       
1 This set includes English Common Law, German Commercial Law, Scandinavian Commercial Law.   
2 This set includes the rate of growth, the legal origin of the country, and the degree of openness,.    
Table 8 reports the group of instruments used in the first-step regression. The rows give the names of the dependent variables in the first-step regression. 
The columns describe the different groups of instruments used in each regression, noting “Yes” if that group is used in the estimation of each dependent 
variable. The last column gives the F-statistic on the excluded instruments. 
 
  45Table 10. Labor Targeting and Privatization Prices 
(Dependent variable is net privatization price/sales) 
 
(1) (2)
1.- F irm  an d privatization  ch aracteristics:
N et total liabilities -0.0201 -0.0197












(0.044)          (0.043)         
Direct Sale -0.0122 0.0031





(0.036)          (0.034)         
Strikes 0.0045 0.0057
(0.028)          (0.027)         




(0.026)          (0.027)         
Skill-biased downsizing 0.0203 0.0653
c
(0.036)          (0.038)         
Fem ale-biased downsizing -0.0016 0.0039
(0.059)          (0.049)         
Em ploym ent  guarantee -0.1048
a -0.1119
a
(0.032)          (0.033)         
Pay cut 0.0736
c 0.0171
(0.045)          (0.046)         
4.- M acroeconom ic Variables:
Gross Dom estic Product  0.0535
a 0.0563
a




(0.000)          (0.000)         
OECD 0.0235 0.0013
(0.042)          (0.043)         
Constant -0.7677
a -0.7592
(0.294)          (0.339)         
Observations 292 292
R- s quar ed 0. 54 0. 53
F 18.6 19.64
Prob > F       0.000 0.000
Va r i a bl e s OLS I V
 
 
The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after 
all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale 
and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares 
sold and divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The real value of the resulting 
number as of December 2000 is used. Column (1) considers prior restructuring measures and the rest of variable as 
“exogenous” and provide estimates from OLS and TOBIT regressions. Column (2) shows the second stage of the 
two-step procedure to take account of endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm size controls. 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 
10 percent. 
  46Table 11. Voluntary and Compulsory Targeting and Privatization Prices 
Dependent variable is net privatization price/sales 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.- Firm and privatization characteristics:
Net total liabilities -0.0203 -0.0241 -0.0238 -0.0208


















(0.042)          (0.043)          (0.045)             (0.044)       
Direct Sale -0.0163 0.0016 -0.0095 -0.0109







(0.034)          (0.035)          (0.035)             (0.035)       
Strikes -0.0008 0.0024 -0.0085 -0.0012
(0.028)          (0.027)          (0.028)             (0.028)       
3.-  Labor Policies:
Voluntary age-biased downsizing -0.0911
a -0.0568
b
(0.032)          (0.022)         
Voluntary skill-biased downsizing 0.0347 0.0111
(0.050)          (0.018)         
Voluntary female-biased downsizing -0.1408
c 0.0078
(0.073)          (0.035)         
Compulsory age-biased downsizing -0.0221 -0.081
(0.032)             (0.066)       
Compulsory skill-biased downsizing 0.0311 0.0142
(0.046)             (0.046)       
Compulsory female-biased downsizing 0.0604 0.0587
(0.071)             (0.066)       





(0.032)          (0.033)          (0.033)             (0.034)       
Pay cut 0.0664 0.0723
c 0.0718 0.0141
(0.044)          (0.043)          (0.046)             (0.046)       
4.- Macroeconomic Variables:










(0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)             (0.000)       
OECD 0.01 -0.0017 0.0205 0.0301






(0.297)          (0.334)          (0.303)             (0.344)       
Observations 292 292 292 292
R-squared 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.52
F 21.24 19.74 17.6 17.64
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OLS IV Variables OLS IV
 
The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after 
all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale 
and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares 
sold and divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The real value of the resulting 
number as of December 2000 is used. Columns (1) and (3) consider prior restructuring measures and the rest of 
variable as “exogenous” and provide estimates from an OLS regression. Columns (2) and (4) show the second 
stage of the two-step procedure to take account of endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm 
size controls. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c 
significant at 10 percent 
  47Table 12. Voluntary Downsizing and Re-Hiring 
 
Probit  dF/dX Probit dF/dX Probit  dF/dX
(1)  (2) (3) 
Voluntary downsizing  0.4228  (0.184)       
b [0.1664] 0.6616 (0.218)   
b [0.2576] 0.9103  (0.278)       
b [0.3014]
Union  0.8231  (0.300)       
a [0.2886] 0.7164 (0.349)   
b [0.2547] 1.2093  (0.477)       
b [0.4211]
ILO Conventions  -0.0069 (0.004)    [-0.0026]
Labor Firing Cost  -0.1969  (0.136)        [-0.0782]
Constant  -2.857  (1.763)       
c  -6.6483 (2.307)   
b -4.9752  (2.858)       
c 
Observations  225  165 120 
Log likelihood  -144.49  -102.02 -94.92 
Wald chi2  18.37  18.60 22.01 
Prob > chi2       0.010  0.02 0.000 
Probit  dF/dX Probit dF/dX Probit  dF/dX
(1b)  (2b) (3b) 
Voluntary downsizing  0.1132  (0.230)        [0.0203] 0.1470 (0.248)    [0.0336] 0.2257  (0.277)        [0.0632]
Union  0.7471  (0.450)       
c  [0.0915] 0.7769 (0.468)    [0.1265] 0.5128  (0.549)        [0.1147]
ILO Conventions  -0.0020 (0.004)    [-0.0004]
Labor Firing Cost  -0.1626  (0.136)        [-0.0446]
Constant  -4.9675  (2.220)       
b  -3.6663 (2.571)    -0.0369  (3.174)       
Observations  225  165 120 
Log likelihood  -75.76  -68.25 -58.78 
Wald chi2  6.27  4.01 2.83 
Prob > chi2       0.060  0.07 0.08 
All regressions include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies and country macro controls 
 Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively.  
a   significant at 1 percent;  
b   significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent
Dependent Variable: re-hire same
Dependent Variable: re-hire
  48Table 13. Labor Targeting and Re-Hires 
 
Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX
(1) (2) (3)
Age-biased downsizing 0.793 (0.197)   
a [0.2981] 1.0237 (0.238)   
a [0.3678] 0.9944 (0.293)   
a [0.3784]
Skill-biased downsizing -0.565 (0.241)   
b [-0.2085] -0.5943 (0.278)   
b [-0.2155] -0.7135 (0.320)   
b [-0.2756]
Female-biased downsizing 0.465 (0.397)    [0.1838] 0.3026 (0.498)    [0.1198] 0.5056 (0.662)    [0.1900]
Union 0.629 (0.307)   
b [0.2278] 0.4345 (0.355)    [0.1605] 0.6888 (0.521)    [0.2639]
ILO Conventions -0.0060 (0.005)    [-0.0023]
Labor Firing Cost -0.1001 (0.118)    [-0.0398]
Constant -3.470 (1.581)   
b -6.5214 (2.015)   
b -2.5540 (3.004)   
Observations 225 165 120
Log likelihood -136.58 -94.98 -70.67
Wald chi2 36.49 35.58 23.68
Prob > chi2      0.000 0.000 0.000
Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX
(1b) (2b) (3b)
Age-biased downsizing 1.01995 (0.306)   
a [0.1230] 1.0219 (0.319)   
a [0.1596] 1.3562 (0.437)   
a [0.2382]
Skill-biased downsizing -0.9376 (0.485)   
b [-0.0827] -0.9133 (0.485)   
b [-0.1161] -1.0959 (0.593)   
b [-0.1708]
Female-biased downsizing 0.4138 (0.619)    [0.0733] 0.0968 (0.652)    [0.0187] 0.3396 (0.884)    [0.0912]
Union 0.4768 (0.504)    [0.0504] 0.6451 (0.502)    [0.0876] 0.2419 (0.621)    [0.0617]
ILO Conventions -0.0013 (0.004)    [-0.0002]
Labor Firing Cost -0.1648 (0.127)    [-0.0380]
Constant -5.2937 (1.761)   
b -3.0693 (2.152)    2.4248 (3.436)   
Observations 225 165 120
Log likelihood -67.77 -61.21 -55.11
Wald chi2 22.67 23.38 17.55
Prob > chi2      0.001 0.002 0.020
All regressions include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies and country macro controls
 Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively. 
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent
Dependent Variable: re-hire





  49Table 14. Voluntary Targeting and Re-Hiring 
 
Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX
(1) (2) (3)
Voluntary age-biased downsizing 0.577 (0.196)   
a [0.2266] 0.8777 (0.234)   
b [0.3391] 0.9043 (0.290)   
b [0.3415]
Voluntary skill-biased downsizing -0.212 (0.313)    [- 0.0818] -0.5496 (0.368)    [-0.1996] -0.2445 (0.477)    [-0.0972]
Voluntary female-biased downsizing 0.159 (0.561)    [0.0629] 0.6198 (0.500)   
c [ 0.2417] 0.3436 (0.647)    [0.1319]
Union 0.656 (0.285)   
b [0.2381] 0.6159 (0.340)    [ 0.2236] 1.0546 (0.511)   
b [0.3805]
ILO Conventions -0.0064 (0.004)    [ -0.0024]
Labor Firing Cost -0.1376 (0.122)    [-0.0546]
Constant -2.735 (1.337)   
b -7.3389 (2.120)   
b -4.1581 (2.739)   
Observations 225 165 120
Log likelihood -144.06 -99.34 -73.07
Wald chi2 18.94 22.91 17.67
Prob > chi2      0.008 0.003 0.023
All regressions include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies and country macro controls
 Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively. 
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 





  50Table 15. Compulsory Downsizing and Re-Hiring 
Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX
(1) (2) (3)
Compulsory age-biased downsizing 0.324 (0.201)   
c [0.1279] 0.285 (0.235)    [0.1126] 0.0922 (0.277)    [0.0336]
Compulsory skill-biased downsizing -1.164 (0.361)   
a [- 0.3635] -0.939 (0.375)   
b [-0.3138] -1.3226 (0.474)   
b [-0.4478]
Compulsory female-biased downsizing 0.378 (0.478)    [0.1500] 0.057 (0.634)    [ 0.0226] 0.8865 (0.867)    [0.3055]
Union 0.681 (0.292)   
b [0.2445] 0.596 (0.332)   
c [0.2164] 1.1672 (0.484)   
b [0.4069]
ILO Conventions -0.0067 (0.004)    [-0.0026]
Labor Firing Cost -0.0640 (0.120)    [-0.0254]
Constant -2.936 (1.364)   
b -5.7978 (1.962)   
b -4.8954 (3.242)   
Observations 225 165 120
Log likelihood -142.46 -103.35 -73.86
Wald chi2 24.59 19.69 18.1
Prob > chi2      0.000 0.011 0.020
All regressions include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies and country macro controls
 Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively. 
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 




  51Appendix 1.A 
First Stage Probit: Downsizing 
 
Variables Probit  Model 
 
 
Structural Reform     0.6274 
b 
       (0.239) 
 
Political Affiliation of Unions    -0.6572 
a 
       (0.175) 
 
Agent Bank  0.7660 
a 
       (0.248) 
 
Openness   -0.0005 
 




       (0.022) 
 
English Common Law  -0.2370 
 
       (0.204) 
 
German Commercial Code  -0.3418 
 
       (0.269) 
 
Scandinavian Code  -0.7483 
 




       (0.184) 
 
Number of observations  308 
 
Pseudo R Squared       0.15 
 




This appendix presents the first-step regression of the two-step procedure for the 
case of the key labor downsizing measure. Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 




  52Appendix 1.B 
First Stage Probit: Voluntary Downsizing 
Variables Probit  Model 
 
 
Structural Reform     0.6264 
a 
       (0.178) 
 
Agent Bank  0.6300 
a 
       (0.178) 
 




Openness   -0.0027 
 




       (0.022) 
 
English Common Law  -0.1278 
 
       (0.192) 
 
German Commercial Code  -0.2117 
 




       (0.191) 
 
Number of observations  308 
 
Pseudo R Squared       0.15 
 




This appendix presents the first-step regression of the two-step procedure for the 
case of voluntary downsizing. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
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Appendix 1.C 
First Stage Probit: Age-Biased Downsizing 
 
Variables Probit  Model 
 
 
Structural Reform     0.6888 
a 
       (0.1843) 
 
Political Affiliation of Unions    -0.2933 
c 
       (0.156) 
 
Agent Bank  0.5973 
a 
         (0.183) 
 




Openness   -0.0027 
 




       (0.022) 
 
English Common Law  -0.1043 
 
       (0.186) 
 
German Commercial Code  -0.1320 
 




       (0.183) 
 
Number of observations  308 
 
Pseudo R Squared   0.17 
 




This appendix presents the first-step regression of the two-step procedure 
for the case of age-biased downsizing. Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses.  
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 




  54Appendix 1.D. First Stage Probit: Skill-Biased Downsizing 
 
Variables Probit  Model 
 
 
Structural Reform     0.4419 
b 
       (0.210) 
 
Political Affiliation of Unions    0.3613 
c 
       (0.198) 
 
Agent Bank  0.7914 
a 
       (0.207) 
 




Openness   -0.0007 
 




       (0.022) 
 
English Common Law  -0.2826 
 
       (0.265) 
 
German Commercial Code  0.1579 
 




       (0.261) 
 
Number of observations  308 
 
Pseudo R Squared   0.14 
 




This appendix presents the first-step regression of the two-step procedure 
for the case of skill-biased downsizing. Robust standard errors are given 
in parentheses. 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c 
significant at 10 percent 
 
 
  55Appendix 2. Country Sample 
 
Africa:
1. -B e n i n ( 2 )      31 .- Saint Vincent (1)      58 .- Austria (1)     
2 .- Cape Verde (1)      32 .- Peru (13)    59 .- Belgium (13)   
3 .- Cote d'Ivoire (10)    33 .- Puerto Rico (1)      60 .- Bulgaria (1)     
4. -E g y p t ( 6 )      34 .- St. Kitts and Nevis (2)      61 .- Croatia (2)     
5. -G a b o n ( 1 )      35 .- Trinidad and Tobago (2)      62 .- Czech Republic (2)     
6 .- Ghana (8)      36 .- Venezuela (6)      63 .- Denmark (6)     
7. -K e n y a ( 7 )      37 .- Barbados (2)      64 .- Estonia (2)     
8. -L e s o t h o ( 1 )      65 .- Finland (2)     
9 .- Senegal (2)      Asia: 66 .- France (7)     
10 .- South Africa (4)      38 .- Bahrain (1)      67 .- Germany (5)     
11 .- Tanzania (2)      39 .- China (1)      68 .- Hungary (1)     
12 .- Uganda (6)      40 .- India (1)      69 .- Ireland (3)     
13 .- Zambia (3)      41 .- Indonesia (3)      70 .- Italy (7)     
14 .- Madagascar (3)      42 .- Israel (1)      71 .- Latvia (2)     
43 .- Japan (8)      72 .- Lithuania (2)     
Americas: 44 .- Jordan (1)      73 .- Netherlands (3)     
15 .- Argentina (8)      45 .- Korea, Rep. (5)      74 .- Poland (10)   
16 .- Belize (2)      46 .- Kuwait (2)      75 .- Portugal (3)     
17 .- Bolivia (8)      47 .- Lao PDR (1)      76 .- Russia (3)     
18 .- Brazil (16)    48 .- Malaysia (3)      77 .- Serbia (1)     
19 .- Canada (4)      49 .- Pakistan (1)      78 .- Slovak Republic (2)     
20 .- Chile (4)      50 .- Philippines (3)      79 .- Spain (5)     
21 .- Colombia (9)      51 .- Qatar (1)      80 .- Sweden (3)     
22 .- Dominican Republic (2)      52 .- Singapore (2)      81 .- Switzerland (2)     
23 .- El Salvador (2)      53 .- Sri Lanka (1)      82 .- Turkey (2)     
24 .- United States (2)      54 .- Taiwan (1)      83 .- United Kingdom (13)   
25 .- Grenada (1)      55 .- Thailand (1)     
26 .- Guatemala (1)      56 .- Yemen, Rep. (1)      Oceania:
27 .- Guyana (3)      84 .- Australia (3)     
28 .- Jamaica (4)      Europe: 85 .- New Zealand (4)     
29 .- Panama (2)     
30 .- Mexico (8)      57 .- Albania (2)       
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